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ABSTRACT 
The Internet revolution of democracy, which will 
transform earthly representative democracies by 
employing the communication and collaboration 
capabilities of the Internet, has yet to come.  Here, we 
enlist the wisdom of our forefathers to lead the way.  By 
consulting the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and 
of the Citizen, we distill core values of democracy and 
derive from them requirements for the foundations of 
e-democracy. Building these foundations can usher the 
urgently-needed revolution of democracy. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Representative democracy is in retreat world-wide[1-3], 
as many democracies transform into oligarchies, 
plutocracies or even kleptocracies. A key reason is lack 
of respect to democracy’s basic tenet – equality of rights 
– as the rich, the powerful and the connected 
increasingly dominate who gets nominated, who gets 
elected and what the elected do.  The forefathers of 
democracy have identified this to be “...the sole cause of 
public calamities and of the corruption of 
governments.”[4] 
The Internet, on the other hand, is revolutionizing 
industry after industry, leaving older ways of human 
conduct in the dustbin of history.  Yet, it has not changed 
the basic workings of democracy: Representative 
democracy today functions essentially as it did two 
hundred years ago (Internet-enabled disruptions of 
elections notwithstanding). 
How could this be?  How come an Internet revolution of 
democracy has not happened yet, despite the pressing 
need for it and the apparent clear ability of the Internet 
to deliver it?  I believe a key reason is that amalgamating 
“Internet” and “Democracy” into an Internet democracy, 
or e-democracy, is harder than it seems.  
                                                                         
1 To appear in Communications of the ACM 
E-democracy has at least two meanings: (i) Using the 
Internet to strengthen real-world democracies[1, 5] and 
(ii) Democratic conduct of virtual Internet 
communities[6].  When viewed as objectives they 
coalesce, as one entails or requires the other. 
Amalgamating “Internet” and “Democracy” presupposes 
universal Internet access as well as net neutrality and 
freedom; their absence undermines the legitimacy of e-
democracy, as a regime can exclude an oppressed 
minority, or a service provider can make e-democracy a 
super-premium service, excluding the poor. 
Even if the Internet infrastructure is universally 
accessible, neutral and fair, utilizing an existing Internet 
application such as Facebook and its siblings as a 
foundation for e-democracy is a non-starter: They are 
prone to duplicate and fake accounts and, crucially, to 
nondemocratic oversight, control and arbitrary 
intervention by their owners. Even Wikipedia, a 
hallmark of Internet participation, is governed neither by 
its readers nor by its editors, but by an appointed board 
that has full legal authority to shut it down, e.g. to avert 
bankruptcy.  
Hence, new foundations for e-democracy are needed.  We 
envision these foundations to simultaneously support 
the democratic conduct of all types of communities: 
Associations, clubs, unions, cooperatives, organizations, 
movements, and political parties; and at all levels – local, 
national, transnational, and international; eventually 
including cities, states and federations; and, ultimately, 
uniting the entire humanity in a global e-democracy. 
Among these communities, the pivot for revolutionizing 
earthly democracies may be Internet-resident 
democratic political parties, or e-parties.  Only by 
winning real-world elections, e-parties can export the 
participatory practices of e-democracy from their inner 
workings to real-world governments, enacting 
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legislation that gradually supplants traditional 
representative democracy by e-democracy.  
But what are these foundations?  Who could guide us in 
their construction? A standard method in requirements 
engineering is to interview the prospective customer.  
The prospective “customer” for e-democracy is humanity 
at large. Hence,  in lieu of an interview, we enlist one of 
humanity’s most inspiring documents:  The 1789 French 
Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen[4]  
(Henceforth: Declaration),  which offers a concise, clear 
and bold expression of the essence of democracy. We 
study its Articles, extract from them core democratic 
values, and derive from these values requirements for 
the foundations of e-democracy. 
2 CORE VALUES OF DEMOCRACY  
We list core democratic values extracted from the 
Articles (marked by A) of the Declaration (Interpreting 
Man→  Person, Citizen→Member, and 
Nation→Community): 
1. Sovereignty: The Declaration’s Article III (A3) states 
that “The principle of any sovereignty resides essentially 
in the Nation. No body, no individual can exert authority 
which does not emanate expressly from it.”  We interpret 
this principle to mean that the members of an e-
democracy are its sovereign. 
2. Equality: A1 states that “Men are born and remain 
free and equal in rights. …”.  Together with A3 they imply 
that sovereignly must be equally shared, often stated as 
one person – one vote. But there is more to equality than 
the right to vote. A4 states that the law is the expression 
of the general will and that all people have the right to 
contribute to its formation; and equally so, according to 
A1.  A6 further states that all people, being equal in the 
eyes of the law, are equally admissible to all public posts. 
Equality extends not only to rights but also to 
obligations: A12–14 ascertain the need for public 
services and for equally sharing their financing among 
members, but progressively, according to their ability to 
pay.  
To summarize, all members of a democracy must have 
equal capacity to act as voters, discussants, proposers 
and public delegates, as well as share progressively the 
burden of public expenditures. 
3. Freedom:  A1 states that “men are born and remain 
free”.  The nature of this freedom is further elaborated in 
other articles: A10-11 espouse the freedom of 
expression within the limits if the law.  A5 proclaims the 
freedom to take any action that is not harmful to others. 
Among those implied freedoms we note the freedom of 
assembly[7], granting any group of people the freedom 
to assemble, and the subsidiary principle, granting 
such a group the freedom to make decisions that pertain 
to them. 
4. Transparency: A14-15 require that the conduct of 
public agents and the collection and expenditure of 
public funds be transparent.  Furthermore, A2 states that 
the goal of any political association must be the 
conservation of the natural and imprescriptible rights of 
man: liberty, property, safety and resistance against 
oppression.  This can be ascertained in an ecosystem of 
e-democracies only if the decisions of each are 
transparent to the others. 
5. Property and Privacy:  A17 recognizes the right for 
property and its private use, which, extended to our 
times, incorporates the right for the ownership and 
privacy of information. The right to safety and resistance 
against oppression (A2) entails voter privacy to resist 
coercion.   
6. Justice: Revolt against unjust rulers was crucial to the 
emergence of democracy, and justice is the focus of early 
charters of democracy such as the English Magna 
Carta[8] and the French Declaration. Indeed, A1 and A4-
13 address the equal and just conception, application 
and enforcement of the law.  Furthermore, A16 states 
that a constitution is needed to guarantee the rights of 
citizens and the separation of the powers of government. 
3 REQUIREMENTS OF FOUNDATIONS OF E-DEMOCRACY  
We now aim to derive from these core democratic values 
requirements for the foundations of e-democracy. 
1. Sovereignty: Internet communities today, from the 
local bulletin board to almighty Facebook, are dictatorial, 
with an omnipotent administrator who determines who 
gets in, who is thrown out and what actions may each 
member take.  The administrator also has the capacity to 
shut down the community and annihilate its recorded 
history at will. Furthermore, communities like Facebook 
employ rule-by-decree like bygone Middle Ages 
fiefdoms.  The owner, like a feudal lord, sets the rules 
(sometimes in secrecy), tries members for breaching 
them and executes the punishment.  The members, like 
serfs, toil for the financial benefit of the lord while having 
no (intellectual) property, civil rights, or voting rights.  
They have no say on their remuneration or tax, on 
community rules of conduct or their enforcement, or on 
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the election of community leadership.  In the event of a 
bankruptcy or hostile takeover, the entire community 
and its recorded history may be annihilated, with 
community members being helpless bystanders. All this 
clearly violates all of democracy’s core values – 
sovereignty, equality, freedom, transparency, property, 
privacy and justice.  
First, we consider the question of ownership. Any 
seemingly sovereign e-democracy that resides on 
computers operated by a third party could be unplugged 
at its will, or its default, rendering sovereignty 
meaningless.  Hence, in the context of an e-democracy, 
sovereignty requires ownership. 
How can the members of an e-democracy be the 
sovereign and hence necessarily the owner? Advances in 
cryptocurrencies and blockchain technology provide the 
first example.  In a DAO (Decentralized Autonomous 
Organization)[6], built on top of Ethereum, the 
dictatorial system administrator is replaced by a smart 
contract, namely an autonomous, incorruptible, 
transparent and persistent software agent, programmed 
to obey democratic decisions (albeit with one coin – one 
vote, not one person – one vote). The DAO operates on a 
distributed computer network with no central 
ownership.  A few caveats: First, an early DAO venture 
capital fund had a bug that allowed a malicious member 
to syphon its funds. Smart-contract programming in 
general and the DAO architecture in particular have yet 
to mature to offer a sound foundation for e-democracy.   
Second, Ethereum and Bitcoin, while having distributed 
control in theory, have a core group of miners that could 
control and subvert them should they decide to join 
forces, a risk that a future e-democracy at the national or 
global scale cannot afford.  Third, current proof-of-work 
consensus protocols of public blockchains incentivize 
inconceivable and unsustainable waste of energy, which 
cannot be endorsed by any moral person or organization. 
Fourth, a replicated ledger such as Ethereum and 
Blockchain could not support the high-throughput  
transaction rate and response time required by a 
national or global e-democracy; a distributed ledger 
architecture is needed.  Fifth, to foster participation 
rather than greed, a democratic cryptocurrency should 
reward participation[9], rather than capital-intensive 
coin-mining; the globally-unique digital identities 
required for e-democracy, discussed below, may afford 
egalitarian cryptocurrency mining[9, 10].  
The economy of a democratic cryptocurrency could be 
programmed with democratically instituted taxes and 
budgets (e.g., [11, 12]) to operate the e-democracy. 
In summary, a distributed public ledger employing a 
democratic cryptocurrency and programmed to adhere 
to democratic control could ensure that the members of 
an e-democracy are its sovereign and owner. 
2. Equality: Equality entails one person – one vote.  Yet e-
democracies consist of digital identities, not people. 
Requiring one digital identity – one vote is not enough, as 
most existing systems allow a person to create as many 
digital identities as one wishes. 
To support equality in an e-democracy, a new notion of 
digital identity must be devised that is truthful, unique, 
persistent, and owned by the person it represents.  
Otherwise, if fake – the owner may vote on behalf of a 
non-existent person; if non-unique – the owner may cast 
multiple votes; if not persistent – the owner may 
terminate and shed an obligated identity and acquire a 
fresh one clear of obligations, eluding accountability; and 
if not owned by the person it represents – it grants its 
owner an extra vote at the expense of the person it 
represents. 
While truthfulness is a common requirement, e.g. in 
credit card and mobile phone contracts, uniqueness and 
persistency are not, as a person may obtain numerous 
credit cards, mobile phones and email accounts and 
terminate them at will. Government-issued identity 
numbers, often complemented with biometric attributes 
and incorporated in digital identity cards (cf. e-Estonia, 
India’s Aadhaar) may serve as a unique and persistent 
digital identity attribute.  
However, e-democracies may transcend national 
boundaries, e.g. in regional and international 
organizations.  Realizing equality in global e-
democracies is a bigger challenge:  First, unhindered 
Internet access should be a recognized basic civil right 
and be provided universally. Second, some people, 
notably refugees, may have no verifiable national 
identity, yet should be granted participation in a global 
e-democracy. Third, people may have multiple 
citizenships, and without an additional notion of “global 
citizenship” with an associated globally-unique digital 
identity, one may have multiple votes, violating equality. 
Fourth, malicious nondemocratic regimes may produce 
an arbitrary number of fake national identities and use 
them (in a Sybil attack[13]) to sway the vote of a global 
e-democracy in favor of their national interest. 
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A trustworthy notion of global citizenship; a mechanism 
to endow each global citizen with a truthful, persistent 
and globally-unique global digital identity; and a global 
judiciary empowered to revoke fake or duplicate global 
digital identities and to transfer stolen identities back to 
their rightful owners, as well as to prosecute the 
perpetrators of these crimes, are all needed to ensure 
equality in a global e-democracy.   
3. Freedom:   As freedom of expression is granted 
within the limit of the law, its realization requires a 
constitution that determines these limits and a judiciary 
that enforces them, discussed below.  Freedom of 
assembly can by realized by a software architecture that 
allows the unhindered formation of one e-democracy 
within another. To uphold the subsidiary principle, 
each subsidiary democracy should be able to undertake 
decisions that pertain to it, within the law.   
4. Transparency: The structure of an e-democracy, its 
rules of conduct, its underlying technology, the source 
code of its software, as well as the decisions of its 
communities, the actions of its public delegates and its 
finances must all be transparent to all. (We acknowledge 
that in an extreme scenario, resisting an oppressive 
regime may necessitate compromised transparency.) 
5. Property & Privacy: The ownership of private data 
and its measured disclosure to third parties only as 
needed can be supported with self-sovereign 
identities[14]. Ensuring privacy of voters and avoiding 
coercion require advanced cryptographic techniques 
such as anonymous credentials[15] and coercion-
avoidance. 
6. Justice and Accountability: To advance from the 
Internet Middle Ages and supplant Internet fiefdoms 
with e-democracies, we must offer justice – a democratic 
mechanism for establishing fair law and order.  Its 
components must be a constitution, subject to 
democratic amendment, and a democratically-elected 
judiciary that rules according to the constitution.   
e-democracies will come under criminal attack through 
identity forgery and theft, voter coercion, 
misinformation, hate crimes, and other offences.  They 
can be redressed by the judiciary via a public warning, 
public condemnation, temporary gag, and fines. As 
suspension or, worse, expulsion, violate the basic civil 
right to vote, it may be considered too extreme.  Imagine 
a future in which a person is a member of multiple e-
democracies, which have a joint judicial system.  A 
temporarily limit on participation in all these 
democracies simultaneously, analog to jail time in the 
real world, may be severe indeed.  But for such a 
punishment to be effective, accountability must be 
ensured: it is not sufficient that the offending digital 
identity be truthful; it has to be unique and persistent, 
lest the offender sheds the punishment by abandoning 
one  identify in favor of another.  
7. Hysteresis: Democracy’s forefathers have not 
foreseen the immediacy with which the general will can 
be ascertained on the Internet.  Eventually, the general 
will must prevail lest we violate sovereignty. But it 
should go through reasonable checks and balances until 
it does, lest mob dynamics prevail.  To this end we enlist 
hysteresis, a characteristic of systems in which the 
output is not an immediate function of the input.  
While a multi-year election cycle confers natural 
hysteresis on earthly democracies, e-democracies 
require hysteresis to be engineered, so that swings in 
people’s opinions may not immediately result in 
decisions that accommodate such swings. Example are 
minimal periods for proposal making and deliberation; 
minimal endorsements for proposals to be considered; 
minimal quorum for a decision to be binding; and special 
majority needed for certain actions, e.g. change of 
constitution.  
4 CONCLUSIONS  
It is my opinion that representative democracies are in 
dire straits because of their failure to uphold core 
democratic values, notably equality and transparency, 
and that e-democracy may offer the only feasible 
remedy.   We have derived requirements for the 
foundations of e-democracy from the 1789 French 
Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen. The 
next urgent step is to build such foundations so that the 
desperately-needed Internet revolution of 
representative democracy would commence. 
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